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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he became the fifth consecutive UK leader to occupy the role over a six-year span.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in France, now on its fifth prime minister in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not witnessed for decades – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: from the moment Macron initiated an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the following day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The president’s office confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s key policy would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Polls suggest the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”